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 DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS*
 IS FEMINISM BAD FOR MULTICULTURALISM?
 Chandran Kukathas
 ABSTRACT: Multiculturalism and feminism are in tension to the
 extent that multiculturalism is a doctrine that condones the tolera-
 tion of cultural communities which might not respect or value
 women's concerns or interests. This has led some feminist think-
 ers, notably Susan Okin, to ask whether multiculturalism is bad
 for women. This paper agrees with Okin that there is a tension
 between feminism and multiculturalism - some of her critics to
 the contrary notwithstanding - but argues that multiculturalism
 should take precedence.
 But stories were already gaining ground that the white man had not only
 brought a religion but also a government. It was said that they had built a
 place of judgement at Umuofia to protect the followers of their religion.
 It was even said that they had hanged one man who killed a missionary
 - Chinua Achebe1
 most important social movement of the twentieth century is ar-
 guably the movement for the liberation of women. Without doubt
 there have been other political movements of great significance, includ-
 ing those to build, and then to destroy communism; and others to liberate
 societies from colonial rule or to create new national states. But as so-
 cial movements go, the women's movement is hard to match, not only
 ♦Delivered at the State University of New York at Albany on 17 November 2000.
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 84 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
 for the transformation of society it has effected and continues to fo-
 ment, but also for the challenge it has presented to the most fundamental
 social and political institutions - from the family to the state. And while
 the most profound changes have been pursued, and to some extent gained,
 in the societies of the developed West, the women's movement is not
 unknown in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
 Feminism is the body of thought that gives theoretical expression to
 this movement. Though it must be said at once of this set of ideas, first,
 that it has a history which predates the women's movement of the twen-
 tieth century, and second, that it is not a single doctrine or ideology but
 a body of ideas which embraces a wide range of doctrines or theories,
 some of them greatly at variance with, and indeed highly critical of,
 others. Nonetheless, while there are many feminisms, it is possible to
 speak of feminism. Following Susan Okin, I take it to mean "the belief
 that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should
 be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and that
 they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely cho-
 sen lives as men can."2 Because it addresses the condition of women in
 general, feminism is a universal doctrine. Indeed, it is one which poses
 a profound challenge to other ethical and political theories which, it
 claims, have universalist pretensions that are implausible because they
 fail to include one half of humanity.
 There is, however, another political development of the late twenti-
 eth century which has come to dominate political theory as well as
 political practice and political action: the demand for cultural recogni-
 tion. In Western societies such as the United States, Canada, Britain,
 Australia, France, and Germany, either or both of two particular devel-
 opments have brought this about. First, the culmination of decades of
 immigration of peoples from a diversity of cultural backgrounds has
 changed the ethnic and cultural composition of the society sufficiently
 that the status of migrant communities and their traditions has became a
 political issue. Second, the emergence of indigenous peoples who found
 the resources and will to question their own social conditions and po-
 litical status within their societies gave concerns about cultural
 protection a prominence they had hitherto lacked. In Canada and the
 United States, moreover, the rise of Québec nationalism and of the civil
 rights movement lent further impetus to the development of a politics in
 which cultural diversity and its implications became a major political
 issue - at many levels of debate and action.
 Arguments about what kinds of political institutions and social poli-
 cies are needed to deal with diversity have become arguments about the
 virtues, and shortcomings, of 'multiculturalism' - a term which has its ori-
 gins in Canadian public policy, but which now has a place in philosophical
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 debate as well as public policy all over the world. What exactly multi-
 culturalism amounts to, however, is not so clear, since policies bearing
 that name vary, and principled defenses of multiculturalism do not al-
 ways defend the same thing. But in broad terms, multiculturalism
 advocates dealing with diversity not by assimilating, or expelling, cul-
 tural minorities but by accommodating them. The significance of this
 development is considerable. Among Western nations such as Australia,
 Canada, and the United States, the dominant view of political elites as
 well as of the general public was that most minorities should be assimi-
 lated. In Australia it was once thought that indigenous peoples should
 be allowed to die out (or be bred out), and migrants assimilated (or, in
 the case of nonwhites, excluded). Now, however, public policy recog-
 nizes that people do not always desire assimilation (even if they do not
 wish to be excluded from membership of political society) and tries to
 find ways of accommodating diverse cultural traditions without requir-
 ing those who live by them to abandon their particular ways. As Nathan
 Glazer put it, "we are all multiculturalists now."3 The political theory of
 multiculturalism tries to explain why - and addresses the problem of
 how - diverse cultural traditions should be accommodated.
 These two social movements which have produced feminism and
 multiculturalism are in important ways the manifestation of a more gen-
 eral development of ideas over the past three centuries. Of central
 importance here is the idea of freedom. Feminist thinkers, from Mary
 Wollestonecraft and Harriet Taylor onwards, have been preoccupied with
 the emancipation of women. And in the history of debate about the reso-
 lution of cultural differences, those who have defended the idea of
 accommodating dissent have also been advocates of freedom - and in
 particular of religious freedom. Feminism and multiculturalism stem
 from common concerns about human freedom. To the extent that they
 are also concerned about the equal freedom of men and women, and of
 people of different cultures or religious traditions, feminism and multi-
 culturalism are also theories of equality.
 If these two sets of ideas reflect some common concerns it is be-
 cause they share a common theoretical inheritance. Both have their roots
 in certain Enlightenment ideas about the value of individual freedom,
 the importance of human dignity, and the need for toleration rather than
 the suppression of difference or disagreement. They have their roots in
 ideas that might broadly be described as liberal. This is not to suggest
 that all feminists or multiculturalists are liberals. That would be far from
 the truth, since many explicitly reject liberalism as incapable of doing
 justice to their moral concerns. Nonetheless, if there are many who try
 to advance the cause of feminism or of multiculturalism by criticizing
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 liberal ideas, this is as much as anything a reflection of the dominant
 place liberal ideas have in these two traditions of thought.
 But while these two traditions of thought share a common inherit-
 ance, they are also in serious conflict. While they may both agree about
 the importance of freedom and equality - of human emancipation - their
 different particular concerns put them at odds. Their political aims are
 in tension. This has been argued most vigorously by Susan Moller Okin,
 who poses the question: "Is multiculturalism bad for women?" and an-
 swers "yes." But the question could as easily be turned around if one
 asks: "Is feminism bad for multiculturalism?" - which could readily
 produce an answer which is much the same. That would bring us to a
 larger question: if feminism and multiculturalism are in tension, what is
 to be done? Which way should we go if we have to choose between
 them? Susan Okin's suggestion is that, to the extent that the two are
 incompatible, so much the worse for multiculturalism. Feminist con-
 cerns should take priority. Some of her critics have tried to suggest that
 the tension is not as deep as she suggests, and that some resolution of
 this difference is possible. My contention, however, is that Okin's analy-
 sis of the tension is fundamentally right; but the question should be
 resolved in favor of multiculturalism. Of course, the issue is compli-
 cated, and qualifications may have to be made, and a more nuanced
 understanding of both these ideas may give us a more subtle and less
 unambiguous conclusion. But while all that is true, it is important to
 state clearly what is the bottom line.
 Yet before the bottom line can be defended, more needs to be said
 about the nature of the tension between feminism and multiculturalism,
 and also about the reasons for resolving the difference in favor of femi-
 nism. Only then can we turn to the defense of multiculturalism. But it
 ought also to be made clear now that such a defense will involve an
 argument for a particular understanding of multiculturalism - one which
 rejects the idea of group rights, and of many of the protections (or privi-
 leges) multiculturalists often claim for cultural minorities. If this
 argument runs the risk of giving offense, it is a risk of offending doubly.
 I. The Tension between Feminism and Multiculturalism
 Katha Polliti puts the matter very clearly when she says that, while
 feminism and multiculturalism may find themselves allied in academic
 politics, as political visions they are very far apart. "In its demand for
 equality for women, feminism sets itself in opposition to virtually ev-
 ery culture on earth. . . . Multiculturalism demands respect for all cultural
 traditions, while feminism interrogates and challenges all cultural tra-
 ditions."4 In this she is agreeing with Susan Okin, who points out that
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 "most cultures are patriarchal . . . and many (though not all) of the cul-
 tural minorities that claim group rights are more patriarchal that the
 surrounding cultures."5 Indeed, some cultures not only have customs that
 aim to control women and render them servile to men's desires and in-
 terests, but have traditions that are so much concerned with the control
 of women that they virtually define the culture in question.
 Feminism and multiculturalism are in tension because feminism's
 overriding concern is the emancipation of women from such circum-
 stances, while the advocates of multiculturalism are concerned about
 how cultural minorities can retain their customs or their cultural heri-
 tage in societies which do not share their values. This means that, for
 feminism, cultures that do not accord women equal dignity, and do not
 consider that women should have the opportunity to live fulfilling and
 as freely chosen lives as men, should not be given succor. Equally, for
 the defenders of multiculturalism, minority cultures should be able to
 resist the encroachment upon their traditions, including those that con-
 fine women, by the dominant culture seeking to impose its allegedly
 universal values upon all groups.
 The extent of this conflict between two different worldviews is evi-
 dent not only in the philosophical literature on multiculturalism, which
 addresses practical issues dealing disproportionately with cultural dif-
 ferences over claims involving gender, but also in the cultural cases
 that come before the courts. When the cultural defense is invoked by
 those facing criminal prosecution, it is often to try to justify the mal-
 treatment of women. In many cultural communities women are denied
 the same access to education as men, are subject to forcible genital
 mutilation in girlhood, or are given no say in the choice of marriage
 partner or in the question of whether to marry at all. Moreover, in many
 traditions, the recognized power of husband over wife leaves married
 women without relief from abuse within the home.
 Feminism is in tension with multiculturalism insofar as it asserts that
 cultures such as these should not be condoned. Indeed, thinkers like
 Okin ask why a cultural group should be entitled to try to live by its
 ways if these ways violate the individual rights of their members. "Why
 shouldn't the liberal state, instead, make it clear to members of such
 groups, preferably by education but where necessary by punishment,
 that such practices are not to be tolerated?"6 In the end, Okin suggests
 that it is a serious mistake to think that, from a feminist point of view,
 minority group rights are a part of the solution to the problem of human
 development. On the contrary, they merely exacerbate the problem.
 In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a less
 patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the basis of
 self-respect or freedom that the female members of the culture have a
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 clear interest in its preservation. Indeed, they might be much better off if
 the culture into which they were born were either to become extinct (so
 that its members would become integrated into the less sexist surround-
 ing culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce
 the equality of women - at least to the degree to which this value is up-
 held in the majority culture.7
 Okin is quite right to identify this tension or conflict between femi-
 nism and multiculturalism. Some of her critics have tried to suggest that
 her view is not sensitive enough to the subtleties of the various cultural
 and religious traditions she criticizes, since some of them (like Islam)
 have historically been concerned about ameliorating the condition of
 women. And others have painted her as blind to the weaknesses - as
 well as to the imperial pretensions - of the liberal feminist ideology from
 which her arguments spring.8 But these criticisms do not damage her
 contention that there is a conflict. Even if many of the religions and
 cultures Okin criticizes are in fact less harmful to women than she thinks,
 or indeed even if some of them are entirely benign, feminism and mul-
 ticulturalism remain in tension to the extent that there are any groups
 which neglect the interests of women, and which seek accommodation
 within the polity. Their claims cannot be defended from a feminist point
 of view, for these groups, ex hypothesi, reject or fail to honor the values
 feminism upholds.
 There is no question that there is a conflict between feminism and
 multiculturalism. The issue is, which should prevail when this conflict
 arises; which should govern, or inform the character of a society's fun-
 damental political institutions?
 II. The Case for Feminism
 To the extent that feminism and multiculturalism are inconsistent,
 why should feminism prevail? Okin's arguments on this score are want-
 ing inasmuch as she devotes little space to explaining why feminism's
 claims should trump those of multiculturalism. It is one thing to show
 that multiculturalism is bad for women but another to show that this is
 sufficient reason to reject - or even weaken - multiculturalism. None-
 theless, this does not mean that Okin has no case, only that more needs
 to be said to draw it out so that it might be better appreciated.
 Before doing this, one point that needs to be disposed of is the charge
 that, in putting her arguments, Okin is guilty of cultural imperialism.
 This kind of charge is not uncommonly made against those who criti-
 cize cultures or traditions other than their own - particularly if they
 criticize the customs or practices of colonial peoples, or of cultural mi-
 norities. This is a common fate met by outsiders who dare to criticize.
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 Yet the fact is that many of the claims made by feminists like Okin are
 also made by non-Western feminists (or women generally) who do find
 their own cultural traditions oppressive and offensive, or by women liv-
 ing in particular religious communities who are advocates or agitators
 for reform. Moreover, it is the explicit concern of Okin to address the
 question of whether culture can provide a compelling defense for what
 might otherwise be regarded as morally questionable conduct. She has
 examined the evidence and tried to argue that it cannot. Unless it can be
 shown that the very undertaking of such an exercise is wrong, it is hard
 to see how cultural imperialism can be at work here. If it is, many non-
 Western women are cultural irredentists; and there is no prima facie
 reason for Western feminists not to take their side.
 The more serious problem, however, is that Okin does not fully ex-
 plain why feminism's values should triumph in the contest with multi-
 culturalism. Feminist values are taken as self-evidently true. According
 to Bhikhu Parekh, Okin simply takes certain liberal ideas to be self-
 evidently true, without appreciating that they have only a limited place
 in a morally diverse world.9 Nevertheless, some of Okin's arguments
 allow us to draw out her reasons for thinking feminist values should
 prevail. (These reasons are also quite consistent with arguments she has
 advanced elsewhere in her writings, notably in her book Justice, Gen-
 der and the Family.10) First and foremost, to the extent that patriarchal
 values prevail over feminist ones, women's interests are seriously
 harmed, and if the harm is to be tolerated, some justification has to be
 forthcoming. But not any justification is going to be acceptable. Cer-
 tainly no justification which leaves the interests of women out of con-
 sideration altogether is going to be acceptable; the equal consideration
 of the interests of men and women is fundamental. But more than this,
 it is not going to be acceptable to consider the interests of women as so
 fundamentally different from those of men that they do not desire lib-
 erty, or require self-respect. Societies or communities or traditions that
 inculcate or force women into particular social roles may not only stifle
 women's capacity to make choices about how to live their lives but also
 hamper the development of self-respect and self-esteem. In a patriar-
 chal society "the healthy development of girls is endangered."11
 The feminist objection to many cultures is that they perpetuate pat-
 terns of unequal treatment and control of women. Such women, even if
 they are not the victims of violence or cruelty, are left with little free-
 dom to make choices, or to freely pursue life as they see fit. They lack
 personal freedom in the present, and have no power to make choices for
 their lives in the future.
 What is implicit in these arguments is that freedom and the capacity
 to make choices are of fundamental value, and that multiculturalism does
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 not honor or recognize them. Feminism should be preferred because it
 does. In this regard, Okin takes issue with Will Kymlicka for this theory
 of Multicultural Citizenship, which grants group-differentiated rights
 to minority cultures, including those that practice overt sex discrimina-
 tion. Although Kymlicka is sympathetic to feminist concerns, and says
 he would only grant group-differentiated rights to those communities
 which are internally liberal to some degree, Okin argues that there are
 far fewer groups that would meet this test than Kymlicka thinks. "There
 are many cultures that, though they may not impose their beliefs and
 practices on others, and though they may appear to respect the basic
 civil and political liberties of women and girls, do not in practice, espe-
 cially in the private sphere, treat them with anything like the same
 concern and respect as men and boys, or allow them to enjoy the same
 freedoms."12 Indeed for Okin, as for feminism more generally, "the sub-
 ordination of women is often far less formal and public than it is informal
 and private" - so much so that virtually no culture in the world could
 pass any 'no sex discrimination' test.
 Okin's argument is that there cannot be a case for public support in a
 liberal state for practices which are illiberal. This means that public
 funding of religious education for ultra-Orthodox Jews, for example, is
 indefensible to the extent that young boys are given an education which
 prepares them no other life than one of religious study. This form of
 education is defended by Margalit and Halbertal,13 but for Okin there is
 no grounds for this at all, since it is not an education which is con-
 cerned with the well-being of the individual within a culture - which
 must, she insists, include the right to exit from the group. In the ultra-
 Orthodox society that Margalit and Halbertal are defending, however,
 she argues, the problem is even greater for girls, since their education is
 oriented towards facilitating the religious life of boys. If this is so, she
 asks, what kind of personal identity can the girls develop, destined to
 adjunct female status within the culture that controls their future? If
 this is to be justified, it cannot be on liberal grounds.
 Okin's argument in the end suggests that the reason feminism should
 take priority over multiculturalism is that feminism is truer to liberal
 values. Liberalism's most important moral commitments, for her, are to
 liberty or autonomy, and equality. Thus, while she would welcome "a
 multiculturalism that effectively treats all persons as each other's moral
 equals,"14 what that would require is a multicultural society in which all
 cultures met more exacting (liberal feminist) standards of female au-
 tonomy and gender equality.
 The implications of this view should be emphasized, for they are impor-
 tant. Cultural communities or traditions which are inconsistent with the
 standards of liberal feminism should not be encouraged, or subsidized
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 with public funds. The liberal state ought, in fact, to take active steps to
 educate such groups so that the scope for coercion of women and girls
 within the family is reduced. Furthermore, where necessary, the state
 should punish those whose practices harm women, to make clear that
 such things will not be tolerated.
 HI. The Case for Multiculturalism
 While the feminist case, particularly as presented by Okin, is a pow-
 erful one, I think it should be resisted. But before going on to argue
 why, something needs to be made clear. Many of Okin's critics have
 tried to argue against her case by suggesting that multiculturalism and
 feminism need not be in conflict, and that a slightly different (or more
 subtle or sophisticated) theory would allow space for both political
 stances. Such writers as Kymlicka, Nussbaum, and Parekh accept the
 importance of Okin's concerns, but think that some resolution of the
 conflict she identifies is possible. Kymlicka wants to see feminism and
 multiculturalism as allies working to revise earlier, "complacent" ver-
 sions of liberalism; Nussbaum thinks that a Rawlsian "political liberal-
 ism" offers a suitable compromise which is sensitive to feminist concerns
 as well as to cultural sensibilities; and Parekh thinks that a theory which
 requires liberalism to engage in open discourse with other cultural tra-
 ditions will allow us to select appropriately which liberal values to up-
 hold along with those cherished by other cultures. Yet none of these
 writers, to my mind, has recognized Okin's fundamental point: when
 the interests of women (as feminists construe them) come into conflict
 with the claims of culture, only one can prevail. According to the theo-
 ries of multiculturalism she criticizes, the claims of culture should pre-
 vail - with the active support of the state. She thinks that feminism - and
 liberalism - require that the interests of women trump the claims of cul-
 ture. There is no theoretical halfway house. In the realm of practice we
 have to recognize that there are halfway houses, since practice is al-
 ways a compromise (and one in the process of evolution) rather than an
 exemplification of some pure, static, theory. But theory has to bite bul-
 lets. Okin's theory does this by suggesting that, when multiculturalism
 and feminism come into conflict, feminism should always prevail. Most
 of her critics have not been so clear.
 I would like to argue that when feminism and multiculturalism come
 into conflict it is the latter than should take precedence. Before the ar-
 gument is presented, it will be important to say something about the
 theory of multiculturalism I want to defend, for it is very different from
 the view advanced by writers like Kymlicka, or Margalit and Halbertal -
 though it is also a theory Okin criticizes and rejects.
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 The conception of multiculturalism I wish to put forward has its ba-
 sis in certain liberal ideas, most important among them the idea of tol-
 eration. In a world of cultural diversity and, hence, fundamental ethical
 disagreement, a good society is one in which differences are accommo-
 dated and tolerated rather than resolved by force in favor of the power-
 ful. In such a society the state would not exercise power to assimilate
 dissenting views to majority belief, or to expel dissenting people within
 or beyond its borders. Indeed, it would not have the power to do so. At
 the same time, however, it is also true to say that society is not made up
 of fixed or unchanging, neatly defined and divided groups. On the con-
 trary, it is composed of numerous overlapping communities and organi-
 zations, and religious, linguistic, and cultural traditions which are not
 all entirely stable. And these groups wax and wane in accordance with
 social and political circumstances, and also in accordance with the loy-
 alty of their members. In a world of such diversity and instability, the
 accommodation of difference requires not only a toleration of disagree-
 ment but also a structure which does not privilege particular groups or
 traditions. A multicultural society, in short, is one that accommodates a
 diversity of groups but does not accord any group a right to cultural
 sustenance or preservation.
 To put it slightly differently, in this view of multiculturalism there
 are no cultural rights. Groups, or religious or cultural traditions, in the
 end, have to survive by their own resources. They may survive because
 individuals, who are free to associate, accept the authority of the group
 or tradition, and sustain it by remaining members and devoting their
 energy and resources to keep it going. But if these communities cannot
 retain this loyalty they will wither. In the end, groups do not matter in
 themselves. They only matter because they are important for the well-
 being of individuals.
 On this view, groups which act illiberally are not entitled to any spe-
 cial protections so that they might continue to live by illiberal values.
 But neither is the wider society or the state entitled to intervene in such
 societies to ensure that they become more liberal or more like the ma-
 jority of people in society in their practices and beliefs. Groups are not
 to be entrenched, any more than they are to be eliminated. Indeed, the
 authorities in such groups are given no explicit recognition, and what
 power they might exert over their members depends for its legitimacy
 on the acquiescence of those members, who have always the right to
 exit from the community of their fellows.15
 For many multiculturalists, this view is unacceptable because it does
 not give cultural groups much recognition, and certainly gives it little
 external protection.16 It does not grant groups subsidies to allow them
 to preserve their languages if they are dying out, or fund them to enable
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 them to support their arts or other cultural practices. So smaller or poorer
 groups are less likely to survive as their members assimilate into the
 wider community. Indeed, on this view culture does not count as a jus-
 tification for anything. One cannot claim exemptions from the law on
 cultural grounds; culture does not provide a justification for actions
 which are regarded as criminal or breach a contract or are tortious.
 (Equally, one cannot borrow from Shylock and then claim that Chris-
 tian prohibitions against usury entitle one to repudiate the debt.)
 For many liberals, and liberal feminists in particular, however, what
 is disconcerting about this view is that it leaves illiberal groups free to
 deal with their own members, tolerating their practices even when the
 wider society finds them abhorrent. For as long as members acquiesce
 in the ways of their communities or traditions, the view of multicultur-
 alism I advance suggests that they be tolerated.
 Before attempting to explain how such a stance can be justified, how-
 ever, I would like to expound the most serious feminist objections to
 such a view. Once again, the most powerful arguments come from Su-
 san Okin. First, if cultural groups are not homogeneous but are made up
 of elites and masses, and if it is important not to entrench the power of
 elites by privileging them with special support or recognition, does this
 not mean that we should be wary of just leaving groups alone, since
 that simply allows elites to remain in power. In this context, the elites
 might be men, and the powerless masses, women.17
 Second, acquiescence may not be much of a foundation for the le-
 gitimacy of cultural practices "if the 'acquiescence' by some in cultural
 practices stems from lack of power, or socialization into inferior roles,
 resulting in lack of self-esteem or a sense of entitlement."18 If female
 members of some cultures imbibe their sense of inferiority from birth,
 their acquiescence says little about the legitimacy of the group, but a
 great deal about its power over its weaker subjects. The theory of mul-
 ticulturalism being defended here simply looks insensitive to differentials
 of power.
 Third, the theory pays far too little attention "to the enormous scope
 for coercion that exists within the private sphere of family life."19 Here
 Okin refers to a particular example I offered to account for the limits of
 tolerance of illiberal practices. In the case of forced marriages within
 immigrant cultures, I argued that such marriages could be, and in places
 like Britain were, rightly annulled on appeal because they were entered
 into under duress. The immigrant community, though entitled to try to
 live by its ways, has no right to expect the wider society to enforce those
 norms against the individual. But for Okin this sends a message that
 parents may coerce their daughters into marriage if they can get away
 with it. In fact, families can make it extremely difficult for a daughter
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 to invoke her individual rights against the family's insistence on abid-
 ing by their own customs. It is in this context that Okin wonders why
 the liberal state should not make it clear to members of such groups, by
 education or punishment, that such practices will not be tolerated.
 These three objections are important because they go to the heart of
 the matter: the problem of social power. Feminists have long argued
 that women were subordinated not only by being deprived of legal rights
 but by the structure of fundamental social institutions, such as marriage
 and the family, which socialized them into beings who were incapable
 of freedom, and incapable of exercising power. And such power as some
 exercise is of questionable value if it is bought by the further derelic-
 tion of character.20 The question now, however, is: does the kind of
 multiculturalism advanced here tolerate the differentials of power to
 which Okin refers?
 The answer is, I think, inescapably yes. Elites in groups will usually
 dominate the masses. Many who acquiesce will do so because they have
 been socialized or manipulated into compliance, and many families will
 all too frequently bully their daughters into marrying unsuitable boys.
 (For every Elizabeth Bennett who chooses a Mr. Darcy, there is a Lata
 who forsakes a Khabir.) I do not think the reality of such power, or its
 destructive capacity, can rightly be denied.
 The problem, however, is what is to be done about it. This is where I
 part company with Okin, and where I think this version of multicultur-
 alism as toleration puts itself at odds with feminism. The view advanced
 here suggests that the problem of differential social power should be
 addressed by denying any greater authority, such as the state, the power
 to support or entrench existing power. Feminists such as Okin, on the
 other hand, believe that a greater authority, such as the state, should
 have the power to redress, if not overturn altogether, the existing bal-
 ance of social power. But in my view this is not a good way to deal with
 the problem of social power.
 The problem with addressing the imbalance of social power by cre-
 ating or authorizing a greater power to correct it is that there is little
 reason to believe that the greater power will redress rather than exacer-
 bate the imbalance. If elites can capture power in their own groups and
 communities, they are also better placed than the weaker group mem-
 bers to capture power at higher institutional levels. Even if the wielders
 of power at the center are members of different elites, however, it is all
 too often the case that elites have more in common with each other than
 with the masses, and will pursue their own interests first. Simply to
 assume that central power will be benign seems unduly optimistic, if
 not naïve; on the other hand, to assert that it must be so would be point-
 less, since one might then do as well to assert that groups must be benign.
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 As to the problem of determining the meaning of acquiescence, it is
 quite true that acquiescing may be the product of socialization rather
 than a reflection of any sort of independence. But the difficulty is that
 to ignore the preferences of individuals by imputing to them insuffi-
 cient autonomy is also to deny them autonomy, or any sort of voice. If
 women are disempowered by the fact that their acquiescence in the so-
 cial institutions which govern them is conditioned, they cannot be em-
 powered by treating their preferences as inauthentic. There is a genuine
 dilemma here. The suggestion being made, however, is not that acqui-
 escence be taken to mean full voluntary consent or enthusiasm for any-
 thing. It is only enough to suggest that a practice or tradition may have
 a certain minimal legitimacy because it is not rejected by its members.
 It means that one should be wary of threatening it, since to do so would
 be to threaten something which is valued by or has meaning for its mem-
 bers. But it does not mean that the practice or tradition is beyond seri-
 ous criticism or undeserving of reform. The fact that people acquiesce
 in a practice or tradition simply means that one should be particularly
 cautious about the exercise of power to override or overturn them.
 This goes in particular for institutions like the family. Feminists are
 quite right to emphasize how greatly human beings, and women in par-
 ticular, are shaped and controlled by the exercise of informal power.
 But it is precisely because it is so subtle that it is difficult to deal with
 and still avoid doing great violence to people's lives. It is easy enough
 to annul a marriage in which young brides are coerced into taking hus-
 bands before they are ready to make any choice. But it becomes more
 difficult when the bride complies with her parents wishes out of respect
 and a deep conviction that this is her duty to marry, even though she has
 no desire to do so. Such a woman is in an even more invidious position
 than the coerced bride who can run away, for it looks as if she has made
 a genuine choice. It is hard to see what the state can do to prevent such
 things from happening, or what punishments it can mete out to alter
 people's thinking.
 One general reason for arguing that the claims of feminism should
 not override those of multiculturalism, then, is not that the freedom of
 women is less important, or that feminism is wrong to think that women's
 lives in many cultures and traditions are highly constrained and unfree.
 It is rather that the solution to the problem does not lie in strengthening
 the power of the state to effect reform.
 Nor may it be a very promising idea to have the state try to regulate
 cultural communities or traditions in the interest of women. For one
 thing, there is always the problem that the state will regulate in its own
 interests rather than in the interest of those it purports to serve. And its
 primary interest is in preserving its legitimacy and perpetuating its rule.
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 But even if we leave this aside, regulation is dangerous because it tends
 to reproduce the subjects whose behavior it seeks to shape or control.
 One thing Michel Foucault has shown convincingly is that "the legal
 and medical regulation of human behaviour tends to produce subjects
 who 'recognize' themselves in these regulative discourses."21 Once po-
 litical institutions like the state are given the power to regulate for the
 definition of women and their interests it is likely to produce subjects
 who will conform to its constructions. But there is no reason to think
 that these will necessarily bear any relation to the interests of women.
 Yet none of this is to deny that multiculturalism may not also be to
 the disadvantage of women, for reasons already canvassed in this paper.
 So something also needs to be said about why multiculturalism, at least
 in the version advanced here, should be upheld. One important reason
 is that, for all its failings, it is a form of decentralizing political and
 social power. To consider what this might mean, imagine what mono-
 culturalism might mean. In a society characterized by cultural diver-
 sity, and marked by religious, linguistic, and ethical differences, the
 idea of allowing one particular cultural tradition to dominate should be
 troubling. Multiculturalism is a theory which suggests that no tradition
 be allowed to rule unchecked, for society sustains a variety of cultural
 traditions, each of which has its place. The trouble with this is that some
 lamentable traditions will also be capable of flourishing under such a
 regime. The trouble with the alternative is that there is a risk of one of
 those traditions acquiring hegemony.
 The danger here may be no less serious under a liberal regime than
 under any other, if this is a liberalism which thinks it a part of its task to
 engage in the cultural reconstruction of society. This became evident in
 the Australian Aboriginal experience over the past half century. During
 this time, a series of mostly well-intentioned governments and their
 administrators thought that it would best serve the interests of Austra-
 lian Aboriginals if children of mixed descent were taken from their
 families and raised in white foster homes. This, it was thought, would
 at once remove them from communities where mixed descent might be
 stigmatized, and at the same time give these children the benefit of an
 education they might not otherwise receive. After all, it was argued, the
 race was dying out, and perhaps, it was also implied, its extinction would
 not be a bad thing. What the policy failed to anticipate, and which the
 report on the Stolen Generations that appeared in 1999 made abundantly
 clear, was the trauma visited not only upon Aboriginal children but on
 Aboriginal parents whose offspring were forcibly taken. These efforts
 at cultural reconstruction began to cease only in the 1970s.
 In the end, the case for multiculturalism is a mixed one. It is filled with
 dangers and difficulties, many of which cannot readily be overcome.
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 There is a down side to multiculturalism, as feminists have made very
 clear. But at the same time, in societies which are in fact culturally di-
 verse, it does provide an important check on other dangerous tenden-
 cies - most significantly the tendency for power to concentrate and grow.
 In the modern world more generally, however, it may also be neces-
 sary because it performs another important function: to apply a brake
 on the process of social transformation, thereby allowing people some
 space, and time, to adjust. From the perspective of Western liberalism,
 it appears that cultural diversity is a Johnny-come-lately, which is bring-
 ing about an unexpected reshaping of modern Western society. Yet from
 the perspective of those whose traditions lie outside the West, and par-
 ticularly for those in former colonial societies, the changes that have
 taken place in the twentieth century are dramatic and unsettling. A new
 religion settled upon the world, and with it came governments to build
 places of judgment. Even if this will prove in the end to be a good thing,
 the traumatic nature of this development - for those who have emigrated
 from their homelands, as well as for those whose homes have acquired
 new rulers - should not be underestimated.
 The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
 The ceremony of innocence is drowned
 Feminism, like liberalism, is a reforming tendency. And in the end,
 the changes it seeks may be necessary and important. Multiculturalism,
 at least as it is described here, on the other hand, has a conservative
 aspect to it. But the case for multiculturalism is a qualified one. It is not
 an argument for upholding traditions and cultures which must be kept
 immune from criticism and resistant to change. It is only an argument
 for resisting the tendency of dominant ideas and political powers to ac-
 quire greater control than is desirable. Feminism may be bad for
 multiculturalism, but it is not bad in itself. And multiculturalism is not
 an unqualified good.
 Australian Defence Force Academy
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